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I. THE ANTECEDENTS OF THE REFORM
There have been many proposals to modify Argentina's Na-
tional Constitution of 1853/60, which is the fourth oldest consti-
tution still in force. Many attempts were made in the Constitu-
tional Convention of 1957 to modify the Constitution; however,
those efforts were frustrated by the lack of a quorum. In 1972,
the so-called Fundamental Statute, which was dictated by a de
facto military government, introduced a series of constitutional
amendments. These amendments are no longer in force, how-
ever, because of a curious self-destruction provision in Article 4 of
the Fundamental Statute. After Argentina returned to democ-
racy in 1983, the reform process was stimulated by various pro-
posals presented in Congress by legislators from diverse political
parties, such as the Justicialists (Peronistas), the Radicales, the
Christian Democrats, and the Socialists.1
The Executive also strongly advanced constitutional reform
by creating a special organization, the Council for the Consolida-
tion of Democracy, to plan for constitutional change.2 In 1986,
the Council drafted a preliminary report, followed by a second
report in 1987, which advanced concrete and essential sugges-
tions, such as: transformation of the presidentialist system into a
moderate parliamentary system headed by a prime minister; re-
ducing the presidential term from six to four years, but permit-
ting re-election; direct election of the president; constitutionali-
zation of decrees of emergency and necessity; and reduction of
1. See ALBERTO J. RODRIGUEZ SA&, REFORMA DE LA CONSTITUCI6N NACIONAL:
LEGITINIDAD Y COHERENCIA 19 (1994).
2. The Council for the Consolidation of Democracy was created by Decree 2446 of
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the mandates of senators to six years. With the premature ter-
mination of Alfonsin's presidency in July of 1989, the Council's
proposals were abandoned.
II. ThE OLIVOS PACT
A short time after the start of Menem's presidential term,
diverse sectors linked to the governing party renewed the pro-
posal of permitting the president's immediate re-election. This
would require amendment of Article 77 of the National Constitu-
tion, as it only permits re-election after leaving the presidency for
a term. Initially, this was the focus of the reform initiative, al-
though subsequent objectives were added.
In 1989, an ad hoc commission of the Justicialist Party pre-
pared a bill to initiate constitutional reform. On June 23, 1992,
the entire National Council of the Justicialist Party adopted
three decisions of its Committee of Jurists that while specifically
rejecting changes in the dogmatic part of the Constitution of
1853/60, advocated changes in the organic sector. These changes
included: direct election of senators and a reduction in their
terms; extension of the legislative sessions; augmentation of the
under officials subject to removal by impeachment proceedings;
incorporation of duty-free zone; multi-year budgets; preservation
of the environment; constitutional regulation of the parties;
simplification of the legislative process; creation of the Comptrol-
ler General of the Republic and the defender of the people, known
as Ombudsman; direct election of the president, with the possibil-
ity of an immediate re-election; increase in the number of minis-
ters; an autarchy from the Judiciary; converting the Supreme
Court of Justice into a tribunal of cassation; and municipal
autonomy.3
In 1993, the reform process accelerated. On July 8, a major-
ity of the Justicialist block in the Senate introduced another bill
that declared the need for constitutional change. After certain
failures and some retouching, the Senate approved the bill
known as the Bravo Project, on October 21, 1993.4 It was fore-
seeable, however, that the bill would not obtain the two-thirds
favorable vote in the House of Representatives required by Arti-
3. I-9CTOR MASNATTA, HACIA LA REFORMA CONSTITUTIONAL 200 et seq. (1993).
4. RODRIGUEZ SA, asupra note 1, at 17, 77 et seq.
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cle 30 of the National Constitution. Thus, the initiative re-
mained blocked.
The Executive tried to overcome the problem by convoking a
voluntary, nonbinding, popular consultation in order to allow
citizens to express their respective opinions of the necessity and
opportunity of the Constitution of 1853/60's modification.5 The
referendum was set for November 21, 1993. The opposition de-
cided that the referendum was unconstitutional and put pressure
on the legislators, making reform impossible.
In any event, this referendum became astonishingly unnec-
essary. Because of hidden contacts initiated on November 4,
1993, Carlos S. Menem and Rafil R. Alfonsin signed the Olivos
Pact on November 14. This Pact resulted from a set of mutual
concessions. One side agreed to permit presidential re-election
while the other side agreed to a ministerial coordinator to reduce
the powers of the Chief of State. The reform went to Congress.6
Decree 2339 of November 15, 1993, suspended the date of the
referendum. The same result occurred in the Senate.
On December 13, 1993, President Menem, acting in his role
as President of the Justicialist Party, and ex-President Alfonsin,
acting in his role as President of the National Committee of the
Radical Civil Union, signed the Rosada Accord, which comple-
mented the Olivos Pact. As the product of jurists from both par-
ties, the Rosada Accord had three parts: the first established the
Nucleus of Basic Understanding; the second provided the issues
subject to free debate in the constituent convention; and the third
dealt with the means that would be required to implement the
agreement.7
III. LAw 24.309: CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATE
The Executive presented the text of the Olivos Pact to the
Chamber of Deputies which acted as the official chamber of ori-
gin and approved the Pact without change by the two-thirds vote
as required by Article 30 of the National Constitution. From
5. Decree of 2181 of Oct. 22, 1993, completed by Decree 2258 of Oct. 27, 1993.
6. LANACI6N, Nov. 15, 1993, at 11, 12.
7. LA NACI6N, Dec. 14, 1993; ROBERTO DROM, NUEVO EsTADO NUEVO DERECHO:
CONSTITUCI6N PARA TODOS, CONSOLIDACIN DE LAS LEYES, CODIGOS DE LA SOLIDARIDAD
271 et seq. (1994). For the text of the Olivos Pact and the Rosada Pact, see El Pzfncipe,
REVISTA DE CIENCIA POLITICA, 1994, at 117 et seq.
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there the Pact went to the Senate, which amended the bill to re-
move the proposal to reduce the senator's term to four years. On
December 29, 1993, the Senate approved the bill by the neces-
sary two-thirds vote." The proposal, however, did not return to
the Deputies as required by the legislative procedure prescribed
by Article 71 of the Constitution. Instead, the bill was sent di-
rectly from the Senate to the Executive. The President promul-
gated the measure as Law 24.309 on December 29, 1993, and its
publication in the Boletin Oficial occurred on the thirty-first of
the same month.
This variation in legislative procedure produced the first
challenge to the constitutionality of Law 24.309. F61ix Lon, Flor-
entino Izquierdo, and Alberto A. Spota took the position that the
so-called Law 24.309 was simply not law.9 This author ques-
tioned the constitutionality of Law 24.309 because two distinct
texts were approved by the two chambers. The Senate's text dif-
fers from the one approved by the Chamber of Deputies, which
never approved the final version sent to the Executive as re-
quired by Article 71 of the Constitution of 1853/60.
The argument used to refute the claim of unconstitutional-
ity-that the bill's passage by two-thirds vote of the Senate im-
plied a final and conclusive decision-is incorrect. It is well
known that, pursuant to Article 71, the chamber in which a bill
originated should have the last word if two-thirds of its members
voted in favor of the original version of the bill. The Chamber of
Deputies was never given this opportunity. Consequently,
whenever there is a difference between the text approved by one
chamber and the text approved by the other, the referral of the
bill to the Executive should be a nullity under the constitutional
principle of functionality and the subprinciple of efficiency. Nev-
ertheless, in Polino Hdctor v. Executive Power, the case that
challenged the constitutionality of Law 24.309, the Supreme
Court dismissed the case on the formal ground for lack of stand-
ing and, thus, did not settle the question of the law's constitu-
tionality.
8. HUMBERTO QUIROGA LAVIt, QUE PUEDE HACER LA CONVENCI6N CONSTI.
TUYENTE 18 (1994).
9. See FtLIX LON, Reformaa por unaa monedaa [Reform of the Currency], LA
NACI6N, Feb. 18, 1994; ALBERTO A. SPOTA, La reforma conatitucional [The Constitutional
Reform], 16 REVISTA DEL PROFESSIONAL 7 (1994).
[Vol. 28:1
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Law 24.309 established two areas of reform. The first, called
the "Nucleus of Basic Understandings," reproduced the following
parts of the Olivos Pact: authorization of the immediate re-
election of the president; creation of a chief for the president's
Cabinet of Ministers; an increase in the number of senators to
three per province; the ability to enact decrees of necessity and
urgency; legislative delegation; and among other things, estab-
lishment of the Council of the National Judiciary as the organ for
governance of the Judiciary. The peculiarity of this section was
that it imposed the method of voting to be used at the Constitu-
tional Convention, which required that reforms be voted on as a
bloc and, thus, be approved or rejected as a closed package.",
The other section of Law 24.309 that called for constitutional
reform resulted in open debate of each of the separate topics." It
referred to matters such as: relations between the Nation and
the provinces; political parties; the electoral system; municipal
autonomy; additional powers for the public ministry; powers of
the Executive and Legislative; rights of aborigines; consumer
rights; free competition; and an ombudsman.
The potential area for constitutional reform was quite large.
If the two sectors set out in Law 24.309 were added together, it
was possible for the constituent to change ninety clauses, which
amounted to fifty-five percent of the 1853/60 text.' 2
Law 24.309 included other provisions. Article 6 prevented
the Convention from changing matters whose reform was not
called for under penalty of nullification. Article 7 prohibited
modification of the declarations, rights, and guarantees con-
tained in the First Part of the National Constitution. The Con-
vention was to meet in the cities of Santa Fe and Parana and
finish its task in ninety days after the initial session.la The
members of the Convention were to be elected by a system of
proportional representation. 14
10. Ley 24.309 [Law 24.309], art. 285. See also ALFREDO E. MOONY, LA REFORMA
CONSTITUCIONAL 1994: ANALISIS DEL PACTO DE OLIVAS 21 et seq. (1994).
11. Ley 24.309, art. 3.
12. N6stor P. Saga6s, La auperfide de La reforma constitudonal [The Area of the
Constitutional Reform], LA NACION, Apr. 11, 1994.
13. Ley 24.309, art. 12.
14. Id. art. 10.
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Some considered Law 24.309 unconstitutional because of its
imposition on the Convention of a regimen of voting on a closed
package of reforms. Pedro J. Frias referred to the Convention as
the "Closed Convention," 15 while Miguel Padilla called it the
"Imprisoned Convention." 16 The bulk of the specialists deemed
Congress use of its convocatory power unconstitutional as an in-
vasion of the constituent power of the Convention. 17 This was
also our opinion as to the voting technique prescribed by Law
24.309, although with the clarification that the Constitutional
Assembly could adopt on its own voting structure in which case
the unconstitutionality would be purged. On the other hand,
Roberto Dromi believed the procedure set out in Law 24.309 to
be totally constitutional. 8
IV. ELECTION, INSTALLATION, AND FUNCTION OF THE
CONVENTION
The election of the delegates took place on April 10, 1994, in
accordance with Decree 2754 of 1993. The two parties of the Oli-
vos Pact obtained close to fifty-eight percent of the validly cast
votes; however, because of a high degree of abstention and blank
votes, this fifty-eight percent figure signified only forty percent of
the registered electorate. The number of constitutional dele-
gates, according to the National Electoral Directorate, was 303.
The Justicialist Party received 136; the Radical Civil Union, 75;
the Frente Grande, 32; the Modin, 20; and the remainder dis-
tributed among the rest of the parties. 19 No party, therefore, had
15. Pedro J. Frias, La convenci6n.cerrojo [The Closed Convention], LA LEY, 1993-E-
1247.
16. Miguel M. Padilla, Una convencidn Prisionera [An Imprisoned Convention], LA
NACI6N, Jan. 22, 1994.
17. These specialists included Jorge R. Vanossi, Alberto A. Spota, F6lix Lon, Bide-
gain, Pedro J. Frias, Miguel M. Padilla, Gregorio Badeni, Linares Quintana, Aja Espil, IvAn
J. Cullen. See IvAn J. Cullen, Es la Convencidn y no el Congreso la que hace la reforma [It
is the Convention and not the Congress which Makes the Reform], LA CAPITAL (Rosario),
Jan. 14, 1994; ACADEMIA NACIONAL DE CIENCIAS MORALES Y POIfTICAS, LA NATURALEZA
JURfDICO-POLTICA DE LA CONVENCI6N REFORMADORA Y LAS RESTRICCIONES CONTENIDAS
EN EL ART. 5 DE LA LEY DECLARATIVA NO. 24.309, 9 et seq. (1994); See Frias, supra note 15;
Padilla, supra note 16; ALBERTO NATALE, COMENTARIOS SOBRE LA CONSTITUCI6N: LA
REFORMA DE 1994 at 8, 11 (Depalma ed., 1995).
18. Roberto Dromi, La Reforma Conatitucional: Ma y Mejor Reptblica [The Consti-
tutional Reform: More and Better Republic], in REFORMA CONSTITUCIONAL 80 (Ciudad Ar-
gentina ed. 1994).
19. See LA NACION, Apr. 12, 1994 (with respect to the distribution of the banks and
the electoral result). See aiso Ministerio del Interior, Direcci6n Nacional Electoral, Apr.
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by itself an absolute majority, nor could any produce its own quo-
rum to hold a meeting.
The expenses of the reform were calculated at approximately
one hundred million dollars. In rounded numbers, this amounted
to $25,000,000 for the election, $38,500,000 in contributions to
the parties, $15,000,000 in municipality refractions, $14,500,000
in salaries for the delegates and their advisors; $1,200,000 for
mobilizing expense, and $4,500,000 for security.20 This is, per-
haps, the highest amount spent to modify a constitution.
The Assembly began its session on May 25, 1994, and con-
cluded on August 22, 1994. For the most part, the Assembly op-
erated with its own system of regulations for voting on the pack-
age as provided for in the convocatory law, in which the planned
consensus was in the Olivos Pact. Senator Eduardo Menem,
then interim president of the Senate, was elected president of the
Assembly. Except for the initial meetings, the closure, and the
committee meetings, the Convention operated practically in
Santa Fe. The new text was published in the Boletin Oficial of
August 23, 1994 and contained a correction of errors. The reform
was sworn to on the Convention's last day in the Palace of San
Jos6 in Concepci6n del Uruguay, Entre Rios.
V. THE MISSING ARTICLE: LAw 24.430
Although not of great consequence, one should note that in
the first session of August the Constitutional Convention ap-
proved for incorporation into the continuation of Article 68 of the
Constitution of 1853/60, the following text: "Bills that modify the
electoral regime and the regime of political parties must be ap-
proved by an absolute majority of all members of the Cham-
bers."21
This new rule, which originated in the section of the Olivos
Pact designated for package treatment in Article 2(L) and Article
5 of Law 24.309, suffered slight modification by the Assembly. It
was designed to secure that certain laws vital to democracy
would have an extraordinary degree of agreement or consensus
14, 1994, copia fotostatica (Minister of the Interior, National Electoral Directorate, Apr. 14,
1994, photocopy).
20. LA NAOI6N, Jan. 23, 1994.
21. See the text of the new rule, in the National Constitutional Convention, R-TC-
6/94, 12 photocopied edition with the correspondent sanctions of Aug. 1, 1994.
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from the political class and would not be the product of just one
party.
This Article literally "disappeared" and was not included in
the renumbered and harmonized text that the Convention de-
finitively approved on August 22, 1994, as required by Article 5
of Law 24.309, nor did it appear in the edition of the Boletin Ofi-
cial of the next day or the version sworn to on August 24. Al-
though some disagree, this omission apparently happened be-
cause of an error. As to the fate of the "lost Article," as it came to
be called, different theories were formulated. Some considered
the "lost Article" to be in force because it was approved on
August 22 and never revoked. They viewed it as only a formal
function of the arranging the text of August 22 to incorporate the
approved rules. Others took the position that the "lost Article"
was in force as a result of a resolution of the Convention on
August 19 which provided for the validity of all that the Conven-
tion had approved up to the moment of its closure. Since nothing
else had been provided for, the president of the Assembly had the
responsibility for arranging for the Article's publication in the
Boletin Oficial or through another channel.22 This author be-
lieves that the seventeenth transitory clause of the Constitution
is conclusive when it says: "The constitutional text voted upon
and sanctioned by this Constitutional Convention replaces that
in force up to now." This text does not include Article 68 bis, and,
therefore, the "lost Article" is not integrated into this constitu-
tional document. This transitory provision was approved about
mid-day on August 22. If, however, one claims that Article 68
bis23 is valid on the theory that it went into force at the moment
22. See Ivdn J. Cullen, Carta8 as Pais [Letters to the Country], DIARIO "CLARIN," Oct.
11, 1994; Rodolfo Ponce De Leon, El Artlculo Desaparecido de ta Constituci6n [The Disap-
peared Article of the Constitution], DIARIO RIO NEGRO, Oct. 19, 1994; Miguel A. Ortiz
Pellegrini, Omisi6n del Texto Aprobado par La Convenci6n Conatituyente [Omission of the
Text Approved by the Constitutional Convention], in CONSTITUCION DE LA NACI6N
ARGENTINA 47 (C6rdoba, Lerner ed., 1994). For a further account of the lost Article 68 his,
see LA NACI6N, 9/194. See also Miguel Padilla, La Reforma de ta Constitucidn Nacional
[The Reform of the National Constitution], in CONSTITUCI6N DE LA NACION ARGENTINA 27
(Abeledo-Perrot ed., 1994).
For those claiming that Article 68 bis kept its validity, the problem was to be re-
solved through distinct means, according to the diverse authors: decision to publish it (the
Article) was of the president of the Constitutional Convention, of the president of the Na-
tion as responsible of the Boletin Oficial, by way of the dictated law through Congress or
decision of the office of judge, etc.
23. Others refer to it by different numbers. For example, see the edition of the Ar-
gentine Constitution published through the daily 'Pagina 12,* page 18 and 19 compiled by
[Vol. 28:1
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of closure on the afternoon of August 22 in accordance with the
resolution of August 19 and, thus, is not governed by the seven-
teenth transitory clause, the Article nevertheless failed to go
through the entire legislative process as the President of the
Convention never ordered its publication.
In any event, Congress passed Law 24.430,24 whose first ar-
ticle ordered publication of the "official text" of the National Con-
stitution, which is what transcribes the Constitution. This text
now includes lost Article 68 bis, as Part 2(a) of Article 77.
In substance, the adopted solution is legitimate, given the
intrinsic value of the precept in question and the original inten-
tion of the Constituent Assembly to approve it, but this is a dan-
gerous practice for the future. In fact, the Constitution was re-
formed by a law25 in which the Congress, with the help of the
Executive who did not veto it, exercised constituent powers by re-
touching the work of the Convention. The precedent established
by Law 24.430 is therefore pragmatic but unfortunate because it
provides an opportunity for Congress in the future, under the
pretext of editing an "official text," to remodel the constitutional
document through adding, removing, or altering subparagraphs
or articles. This solution as customary rule, however, was valid
with respect to the formal insertion of the "lost Article" into the
body of the Constitution via a branch of government rather than
by the Constituent Assembly, because it was provided for consti-
tutionally.
Thus, Law 24.430 conflicts with the seventeenth transitory
clause of the Constitution because what replaces the constitu-
tional text previously in force is the text approved by the Con-
vention, not what is provided for by Congress. Despite what has
been said, the former Article 68 bis, now Article 77 Part 2(a), is
obeyed by the operators of the Constitution and has generated a
Guillermo R. Navarro, who estimated that the correct actual number would be Article 77
bis.
24. Sanctioned Dec. 15, 1994; promulgated Jan. 3, 1995; published, Boletfn Oficial,
Jan. 10, 1995.
25. See Editorial, LA NAcION, Dec. 24, 1994. See also Victor Baz6n, Qui Serd del
Articulo Que No Fue? [What Will be of the Article That Was Not There?], in 1 ENTRE
ABOGADOS 20 (San Juan 1995). In exchange, maintaining that 'if the norm (article 68 bis)
had not been included in the ordered text of the Constitution, someone ought to make up
for the omission which the Commission committed-that when it was discovered it was
already dissolved," and that this inclusion through law is an 'act of administrative nature."
ALBERTO NATALE, COMENTARIOS SOBRE LA CONSTITUCI6N 28 (1995).
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useful customary constitutional law.26
VI. A CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM OR A NEW CONSTITUTION?
In comparison to the prior constitutional text, which num-
bered 110 articles, the new text has 129 articles and also in-
cludes seventeen complementary rules. This signifies an in-
crease of thirty-three percent in the number of articles.
Measuring the increase in the complete document, taking into
account that the new articles commonly have been given an edit
that is far broader than the brief and concise language of the
Constitution of 1853/60, the Constitution increased quantita-
tively close to seventy percent.
The outward appearance of the Constitution remains simi-
lar. However, a second Chapter entitled "New Rights and Guar-
antees" was added to the First Part. In the Second Part, the
section dealing with the Legislature added two chapters dedi-
cated to the "Auditor General of the Nation" and an "Ombuds-
man." Another new section also emerged addressing the "Public
Ministry" (a kind of fourth power or extra-power). In addition,
the Convention produced a series of qualitative changes in the
structure of the three branches of the State. It also made quali-
tative changes in the area of personal and social rights. In sum-
mary, the approved text of August 22, 1994, does not establish
whether the text is a new Constitution, as many claim, or an
amendment of the Constitution of 1853/60.
To be sure, the Constituent Assembly, itself, promoted such
doubts. On the one hand, in the transitory provisions of the re-
form, the second clause speaks of the "time to sanction this Con-
stitution" and the sixteenth clause speaks of provincial officials
"swearing to this Constitution." To remove doubts, the fifteenth
clause mentions issuance of a law "within a period of two hun-
dred and seventy days from the entry into force of this Constitu-
tion." On the other hand, the ninth clause of same transitory
clause uses the words "this reform," as do the eleventh, thirteen,
26. See N6stor P. Sagtus, Reflexiones Sobre un Fantasma Conatitucional [Reflections
About a Constitutional Ghost], LA NACION, Oct. 8 1994; La situaci6n juridica del articulo
68 bis de la Constituci6n nacional [The judicial situation of article 68 of the National Con-
stitution], E.D., Nov. 8, 1994; Editorial, EL PAlS (Montevideo), Dec. 26, 1994. Gregorio
Badeni takes the position that Article 68 bis is invalid. See Gregorio Badeni, LA NACION,
Sept. 1, 1994.
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and the sixteenth clauses.
This juridical schizophrenia is not merely academic. If the
changes produced in 1994 signify merely a reform, those in
charge of the Constitution ought to repaginate not only the let-
ter, but also the spirit of the traditional Constitution of 1853/60.
Moreover, the ideological dealing of the latter ought to influence
the interpretation and functions of the recent norms. If, how-
ever, Argentina has a new constitution, the preceding is not rele-
vant. It will be the recently created text and its philosophy that
will illuminate the sections inherited from the old but prestigious
constitution.
One datum that somewhat clarifies the problem was the
formula for the oath rendered by the highest authorities of the
country on August 24, 1994, to the Constitutional document.
When the oath was rendered, they made explicit reference to the
Constitution of 1853 with the reforms of 1860, 1866, 1898, 1957,
and 1994. This would seem to put an end to this question.
Moreover, Law 24.430 ordered publication of an "official text" of
"the National Constitution (sanctioned in 1853 with the reforms
of the years 1860, 1866, 1898, 1957, and 1994)."27 Therefore,
this is a constitutional reform and not a new Constitution.
VII. MAKEUP OF THE CONSTITUTION: THE STATUTE OF
POWER
The present Constitutional text has important changes relat-
ing to the design of power that deviate from the previous scheme.
While the text maintains the representative republican and fed-
eral structure based upon a presidential regime, certain novelties
have appeared.
A. Autonomous Organs
In the first place, autonomous organs, such as the Public
Ministry emerged. According to new Article 120, the Public
Ministry is " independent with functional autonomy and finan-
cial self sufficiency". Its function is to promote the operation of
justice in defense of legality and the general interests of society.
The Procurator General and the General Defender head the
27. Ley 24.430, art. 1.
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Ministry. Further, the Council of the National Judiciary, whose
authority is located inside the chapter concerning the nature and
duration of the Judiciary28 appears to be an autonomous entity,
for it does not depend on the Supreme Court of Justice.
B. Executive Branch
Secondly, changes emerged in the organization of each
branch. One of the most promoted changes was the length of the
presidential term. This change reduced the term to four years,
but allows for the possibility of re-election for one consecutive
term.29 Another change modified the regime of electing the presi-
dent and vice-president. Instead of using the electoral college,
these offices are elected directly by citizens.30 To reach the presi-
dency, one must obtain more than forty-five percent of the validly
cast votes.31 Alternatively, a successful presidential candidate
need obtain only forty percent of these votes, if a difference
greater than ten percent of the total of validly cast votes exists,
over the formula that follows the number of votes. 3 2 Otherwise, a
second round of voting must occur with voters deciding between
the two candidates who received the highest number of votes in
the first round.3 The reform of 1994 eliminated the requirement
that the president be Catholic and permitted the presidential
oath to respect the religious beliefs of the Chief of State.3
4
One of the showpieces of the reform was the creation of the
position of the "Chief of the Cabinet of Ministers." The respon-
sibilities of this position require overseeing the general admini-
stration of the country, issuing regulations, naming employees of
the Administration, executing the budgetary law, among other
things.3 5 The Chief of the Cabinet is politically responsible to the
National Congress,36 which can remove him by an absolute ma-
28. ARG. CONST. art. 114 (amended 1994).
29. Id. art. 90. To be re-elected to a new term of office, a president who had served
two consecutive terms must leave office for another term. Id.
30. Id. art. 94.
31. Id. art. 97.
32. Id. art. 98.
33. Id. arts. 96-98.
34. Id. arts. 89 and 93.
35. Id. art. 100(1), (2), (3), (7).
36. Id. art. 100.
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jority of the votes of the members of each chamber.37 This brings
Argentina closer to a parliamentary system. But the president,
acting alone, has discretion to nominate and remove the Chief of
the Cabinet.38 In fact, the Chief of the Cabinet may acquire a
strong political stature or may wind up becoming only an assis-
tant to the president, as occurred in Per(i, whose Constitution of
1979 appears to have started this institution. Considering the
jurisdiction accorded to him by the Constitution, the Chief of the
Cabinet may be depicted as a giant with feet of clay as his tenure
depends on the president's discretion.
The Convention of 1994 also confronted the controversial
themes of decrees of necessity and urgency, constitutionally
regulating these measures. These measures were permitted, but
not in matters involving crimes, taxes, elections, or political par-
ties.39 Such measures must be submitted within ten days for
consideration by the Permanent Bicameral Commission of the
Congress, which in turn must send a report as to how they
should be treated to each chamber. 40 Then a law specially sanc-
tioned by an absolute majority of all members of each chamber
will decide what occurs. 4'
C. Legislative Branch
In this area, the reform planned a third senator for each
province and for the city of Buenos Aires, elected by popular vote
for a period of six years. 42 Two senators are elected by the party
with the greatest popular vote, and one senator by the party with
the second highest vote.43
The legislative process was fortunately shortened through
the possibility of approving the particulars in parliamentary
committees, bills approved in general by a chamber,44or reducing
the number of passes of a bill from one house of Congress to the
other. 45 The reform also provided for the enlargement of the or-
37. Id. art. 101.
38. Id. art. 99(7).
39. Id. art. 99(3).
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. arts. 54 and 56.
43. Id.
44. Id. art. 79.
45. Id. art. 81.
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dinary session, which now occurs from March first to November
thirtieth,46 and placed important restrictions on the delegation of
legislative powers to the president, now solely viable in matters
of administration or public emergency for a determined period.
47
Two parallel organs for the control of the Executive were
created: the Auditor General of the Nation and the Ombuds-
man.48 The latter has an impressive array of functions that are
difficult to perform such as the defense of human rights as well
as defense of other such rights, guarantees, and interests pro-
tected by the Constitution and laws and against acts or omis-
sions of the public administration.
D. Judicial Branch
In the area of the judiciary, fortunate modifications were
made in the selection of judges beneath the Supreme Court. The
reform establishes a preselection mechanism through public
competition run by the Council of the National Judiciary. 49 The
Council sends three candidates to the Executive, who chooses one
and then forwards that name to the Senate for approval.5°
The debut of the Council of the National Judiciary has been
spectacular. It appears to be a super-council, whose members
come from distinct sources such as the political powers, lawyers,
academics, scientist, and judges. Besides the preselection of
judges, the Council serves as the organ for the governance of the
Judiciary. It administers its funds, exercises disciplinary powers
over judges, and issues regulations relating to judicial organiza-
tion.61 The Supreme Court, in turn, is the big loser. It lost the
power to direct the Judiciary, a measure almost unimaginable in
the Argentine law, but which is understandable only on the basis
of the vulnerable situation that afflicts it. The reform also made
the Council of the National Judiciary the jury of impeachment,
along with plural integration, for the removal of the subordinate
federal judges of the court. 52
46. Id. art. 63.
47. Id. art. 76.
48. Id. arts. 85 and 86.
49. Id. art. 114.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. art. 115.
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The Constitution leaves the specific structures of the Council
of the National Judiciary and the jury of impeachment, as well as
the determination of their powers, to the enactment of a special
law.5 This is, in actuality, the secret to the success or failure of
these bodies and the key to their independence or indirect sub-
mission to Congress, the president, or the political parties. Only
the future will tell what form these bodies will take.
The selection of the justices of the Supreme Court was
slightly modified by the requirement that the senatorial confir-
mation be in a public session with two-thirds of the senators pre-
sent.5 This same clause provides for the loss of tenure of all fed-
eral judges after their seventy-fifth birthday, although they may
continue in their functions if renominated for a five year renew-
able term.55 This amendment, introduced surreptitiously at the
end of the sessions of the Constitutional Assembly, had no clear
or convinciary explanation. The amendment has been the sub-
ject of commentary questioning its true intentions.
E. National, Provincial, and Municipal Relations
The federal system was transformed by permitting the
provinces to create regions for economic and social development
and to welcome international agreements under certain condi-
tions.5 The city of Buenos Aires was granted governmental
autonomy with both legislative and jurisdictional powers and an
ability to directly elect its "chief of government," 57 today a super-
intendent. The city of Buenos Aires can also promulgate its own
charter or quasi-constitution, known as the reform of the
"organizing statute." Nevertheless, Article 129 also provides that
the federal government will guarantee by law "the interests of
the National State," with Buenos Aires as the Capital of the Re-
public. This means the city will define itself as "a guided
autonomous entity," a kind of third genre between a province and
a common county. -
53. Id. art. 114.
54. Id. art. 99(4).
55. Id.
56. Id. art. 124.
57. Id. art. 129.
58. The city of Buenos Aires approved its own Constitution on October 6, 1996. Pre-
viously, the National Congress enacted Law 24.558, which protects federal interests in the
city of Buenos Aires. There is a significant problem in harmonizing their two legal norms.
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This reform left a grave gap because it does not clarify who
determines the legislative and jurisdictional powers that Article
129 recognizes for the city of Buenos Aires. It is not absurd to
think that Convention dictates the "organizing statute" of the
city as provided for in the last part of Article 129. But it could be
the National Congress given that it is responsible for protecting
"the interests of the Nation, while the city of Buenos Aires is the
capital of the Nation," as Article 129 provides. Moreover, Article
75(30) empowers Congress with "exclusive legislation in the ter-
ritory of the Nation's Capital."
The general controversy stems from the constitutional
document, which is unclear in Article 129 and even contradictory
in Article 75(30). The interpreters and the administrators of the
Constitution must workout useful and just answers that will
make compatible and more precise what the Constitution's rules
are.
In the inevitable controversy of this subject, recognizing the
requirement to protect the authentic and legitimate "interests of
the Nation" and taking into account genuine circumstances of
time and convenience, Congress is well suited to demarcate the
legislative and jurisdictional powers of the city of Buenos Aires
with the opportunity of judicial review if the regulation is clearly
unreasonable. If there is doubt in this matter, in principle, the
criterion of the federal state ought to prevail, consistent with Ar-
ticle 75(30). Finally, the organizing statute of the city ought to
control the exercise of the city's own legislative and jurisdictional
powers.5 9
Article 75(2), which deals with the powers of Congress,
placed into the Constitution a fiscal regime of coparticipation for
indirect and direct taxes, the latter for only a limited time. This
regime is determined by the federal government, based upon a
law establishing a compact between the Nation and the prov-
inces, approved by an extraordinary majority; however, the pre-
cise rates of distribution are not set forth.60 The Constitution
sets out certain directives about how to diagram the coparticipa-
tion, such as objective criteria for division, equity, solidarity, and
59. For discussion of this subject, see HORACIO D. CREO BAY, AUTONOMIA Y GO.
BIERNO DE LA CIUDAD DE BUENOS AIRES (1995).
60. ARG. CONST. art 75(2) (amended 1994).
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equivalent degree of development.61 It also includes a draft of a
federal fiscal organism to supervise the execution of jurisdictional
transfers and reassignments of resources, along the lines of Arti-
cle 75, subparagraph two.62 All of them, however, depend on
later implementation.
With respect to the rest of the municipalities of the country,
the recent amendment guarantees their institutional, political,
administrative, economic, and financial autonomy.63 This is so
emphatically enunciated that one expects each province will
closely adhere to this proportion in concrete terms.
F. International Relations
An important change has been the status of treaties, for the
new text accords constitutional rank, under certain conditions, to
certain human rights conventions.6 This does not signify, how-
ever, that these conventions are formally integrated into the
Constitution, even though they are valued like the Constitution.
The Constitution authorizes compliance with certain treaties
through transference of powers and jurisdiction to supranational
organizations.65 As a general rule, all treaties are superior to a
law. 66
VIII. THE STATUTE OF RIGHTS
As previously mentioned, Article 7 of Law 24.309, which
convoked the constitutional reform, prohibited the Convention
"from modifying any of the declarations, rights and guarantees"
of the First Part of the Constitution. Nevertheless, the same law
proposed free debate in matters such as preservation of the envi-
ronment, defense of the consumers and borrowers, habeas corpus
and amparo, and other points that refer to theoretically un-
touchable rights and guarantees. Moreover, the convoking law
provided for the enactment of a "Second Chapter to the First Part
of the National Constitution."67
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. art. 123 (amended 1994).
64. Id. art. 75(22).
65. Id. art. 75(24).
66. Id. art. 75(22).
67. Ley 24.309, art. 3.
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The only way to harmonize the internal directives of the law
was to interpret it as dealing with themes concerning rights and
guarantees, whose consideration invited complementing but not
prejudicing the rights and guarantees provided for in Articles 1
through 35 of the Constitution of 1853/60. This is precisely how
it was done. Below is a summary of the principal contributions
following the traditional classification of rights and guarantees.
A. Political Rights
In this section, the following new forms were declared:
1. The Right to Resist the Oppression From De Facto
Governments
This right is declared in new Article 36(4).
2. The Right to Vote
Voting must be universal, equal, secret, and obligatory.68
3. Real Equality of Opportunities for Men and Women in
Candidacies for Elective Office and Political Parties.
This section also legitimizes "positive actions," 69 to protect
women against segregation and secondary positions, inviting
what is sometimes called "reverse discrimination" or privileged
treatment for marginalized groups. Norms like Law 24.012,
which provide feminine quotas on the electoral ballots, now have
an express constitutional basis.
4. Right to Form Political Parties
This must be within this Constitution and in conformity with
the democratic organizational and operative guidelines, the rep-
resentation of minorities and the diffusion of ideas.70 Political
68. ARG. CONST. art. 37 (amended 1994).
69. Id.
70. Id. art. 38.
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parties now can receive economic support from the State,71 a
measure that is certainly debatable. Nevertheless, the parties
should publicize the origin and destiny of their funds.
5. Right of Popular Initiative in Legislative Matters
In its implementing legislation, Congress cannot require
more than three percent of the national electoral census to call
for an initiative. 72 But such initiatives cannot be called with re-
spect to laws dealing with constitutional reforms, treaties, taxes,
budgets, and criminal rules, 73 a prohibition that has little sup-
port and that appears to distrust the abilities of the electorate to
promote the creation of legal rules.
6. Popular Consultation
The new text contemplates two types of actions of the com-
munity in taking of political decisions. One is popular approval
of bills, and the other is a simple, nonbinding consultation that
can be called for by either the Executive or the Congress. 74
B. Civil Rights
This area has many new prescriptions, some of them coming
from convoking Law 24.309, and others from reforms to the
"organic" sector of the Constitution, with respect to the structur-
ing of the powers of the State. For example, when modifying the
powers of Congress in the new Article 75, with certain assump-
tions that "contraband norms" existed and under the pretext of
correcting constitutional rules for which the Constituent Assem-
bly had been called, the Assembly modified rights that were not
included in the reform plan.
71. Id.
72. Id. art. 39.
73. Id. A recent statute, Law 24.747, regulates the right of popular initiative.
74. ARG. CONST. art. 40 (as amended 1994).
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1. Ecological Rights
Article 41 assures the right to a clean environment. It sup-
presses damage to the environment, promotes rational utilization
of natural resources (including its protection for future genera-
tions), and prohibits dangerous residues from entering national
territory.
2. Rights of Consumers and Users
These rights were protected by Article 42. They include
health, security, economic interests, true information, free elec-
tions, conditions of dignified treatment, defense of free competi-
tion, control of monopolies, and control of the quality and effi-
ciency in rendering public services.
3. Rights to Equal Protection
The new text underlined the thesis of real equality in oppor-
tunities and treatment, generally for children, women, the eld-
erly, and the handicapped.7 5
4. Rights of Children and Mothers
Besides the right to equal treatment, Article 75(23) creates a
special protection for the unsupported child. This right extends
from pregnancy to the end of elementary school, and for the
mother, during the pregnancy and the period of breast-feeding. 76
The rule acquires a singular transcendency because it shows the
constitutional protection of the person from birth, and the conse-
quent constitutional condemnation of discretional or free abor-
tion.
75. Id. art. 75(23).
76. Id.
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5. Worker's Rights
The principles of social justice were underlined in a special
way as to the professional formation of employees and the politics
of job creation.77
6. Indigenous Rights
A specific clause recognizes the ethnic and cultural pre-
existence of the aborigines and, among other things, their iden-
tity, bilingual education, the legal personality of their communi-
ties, and their possession and communal property of the lands
which they have occupied from ancient time.78
7. Rights to Education
Here too, the doctrine of equal opportunities and condemna-
tion of discrimination was reiterated. It favors participation of
the family and society in the education process.7 9 It also favors
free and equal state institutions, as well as autonomy in national
universities.8o
8. Author's Rights
The final part of Article 75(19) confers specialized tutelage to
the freedom of creation and circulation of the works of authors as
well as to artistic patrimony and to cultural and audiovisual
spaces.
9. Emerging Rights of the International Conventions
One has to add the complex individual and social rights set
forth in the documents of international law mentioned in Article
75(22) of the Constitution, and those that will be approved in the
future, which will also have constitutional rank. The text of
these treaties, conventions, and declarations are at least triple
77. Id. art. 75(19).
78. Id. art. 75(17).
79. Id. art. 75(19).
80. Id.
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that of the Constitution.
C. Constitutional Guarantees
The new Article 43 of the Constitution explicitly deals with
three guarantees.
1. Action of Amparo
The amparo was designed to combat arbitrary and illegal
acts of governmental authorities or private actions injurious to
rights protected by the Constitution, laws, or treaties."' As a
new development, the Constitution properly authorizes in the
amparo proceeding a declaration of unconstitutionality of the
norm on which the injurious act was based. 2 It also gives
standing to anyone affected, including the Ombudsman and cer-
tain associations, to bring an amparo action for protection of dif-
fuse interests, free competition, users, and consumers.83
2. Habeas Data
Article 43 also permits this variation on amparo, designed to
provide access to information held in public or private registries
or data banks. The action allows reports of such information so
that it can be corrected, reserved, updated, or excluded, in cases
of falsity or discrimination.8 This variation does not affect the
secrecy of the sources of journalists.85
3. Habeas Corpus
Lastly, Article 43 gives express constitutional recognition to
habeas corpus, including application to the forced disappearance
of persons, as well as to the more extensive forms of relief: re-
parative, preventive, corrective, and restrictive.8
81. Id. art. 43.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. See Jorge R. Vanossi, El hdbeas corpus no puede ni debe contraponerse a la liber-
tod de los medios de communicaci6n [Habeas corpus neither can nor should it be able to
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IX. IDEOLOGICAL MARK OF THE CONSTITUTION
The doctrinal text of the Constitution deserves separate re-
flection. It is well known that the 1853/60 Constitution had a
multiple ideological cast blending liberal-individualist ingredi-
ents, Christian traditions, and after the reform of 1957, its own
data of the social state of law.
The reform of 1994 added "third generation" rights
(subsequent to liberal constitutionalism and social constitutional-
ism, such as those referring to ecology and to users) and accentu-
ated the social bent of the Constitution. As indicators of this last
route, one should mention the express assertion of the principle
of social justice8 7 and the repeated references to real equal oppor-
tunities.8 These imply a very valuable theme for the social state
of law, overshadowing the liberal posture of formal equality
"before the law" set out in Article 16. Certain policies are plainly
social, such as the promotion of jobs and training of the work
force, 89 while others insinuate state protagonisms in the control
of "natural and legal" monopolies or in taking care that there is
no distortion in the markets. 90 The clauses, which protect con-
sumers and are contained in Article 42, guard official actions to
intervene and regulate the behavior of supply and demand, as
long as the actions are otherwise legitimate. Similar conclusions
can be drawn from the norms that promote the "national eco-
nomic productivity" and "human development."91 Other examples
of social democracy, such as the semidirect forms of popular ac-
tivity through referendums or consultations, are based upon Ar-
ticles 39 and 40.
As to those clamoring for the dismantling of the social
state,92 the Constituent Assembly took the opposite position, at
least according to the text approved. It maintained the social
offset the liberty of the means of communication], E.D., Sept. 13, 1994; N6stor P. Sagu6s,
Amparo, hdbeas data y hdbeas corpus en la reforma constitucional [Amparo, habeas data
and habeas corpus in the constitutional reform] L.L., Oct. 7, 1994.
87. ARG. CONST. art. 75(19) (amended 1994).
88. Id. arts 37, 75(19) and (23).
89. Id. art. 75(19).
90. Id. art. 42.
91. Id. arts. 41 and 75(19).
92. See RAM6N GARCfA COTARELO, DEL ESTADO DE BIENESTAR AL ESTADO DE
MALESTAR 1986. PEDRO PLANAS, EL ESTADO MODERNO: UNA NUEVA BIOGRAFIA 105 et
seq. (1993).
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state, adopting provisions like defending the valor of money93 and
marking the general budget of calculations and resources in con-
formity with "the general program of the Government and to the
plan of public investments."94 Such a robust ideological position
rebounds, in the interpretation of all the provisions of the Consti-
tution, in the resolution of its doubts and in the integration of its
gaps.
It is interesting to note that the political profile of the Con-
stitution also underlines its democratic nature. The 1853 text
did not categorically include the concept of democracy; which now
expressly appears in Article 36 as well as condemns coup d'dtat
and unjust enrichment at the expense of the treasury, announces
the persistence of the validity of the Constitution despite an
eventual de facto regime, and postulates a law of public ethics. It
also appears in Article 38 with respect to political parties, Article
75(19) which requires education according to democratic values,
and Article 75(24) relating to international treaties that respect
the democratic order. Contrary to the notion of democracy is the
requirement that one must possess 2,000 annual income of hard
pesos in order to be a senator, president, or justice of the Su-
preme Court.98 Another antidemocratic assertion is the state-
ment that the federal government promotes "European immi-
gration,"96 nor is there greater coherence in encouraging the
manifestations of participative democracy, such as initiatives,
popular approval of rules and consultations,97 and continuation of
the statement that the people "neither deliberates nor governs"
except through its representatives. 98
X. THE UNFINISHED CONSTITUTION
It is not easy to formulate a global judgment about the Con-
stitutional text currently in force. Certainly, it lacks uniformity
in style, for the old clauses, generally restrained and concrete,
now coexist with detailed and extensive rules by which the Con-
stituent Assembly often transformed itself into an ordinary legis-
lature.
93. ARG. CONST. art. 75(19) (amended 1994).
94. Id. art. 75(8).
95. Id. arts. 55, 89, and 111.
96. Id. art. 25.
97. Id. arts. 39 and 40.
98. Id. art. 22.
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The reform has also resorted to complex formulas, such as
combining five kinds of international treaties,9 9 that are prob-
lematic not only in themselves, but also in fitting with the First
Part of the Constitution. The new rules indicate that the treaties
mentioned in Article 75(22), paragraph two, "do not derogate
from any article of the First Part of this Constitution and ought
to be understood as complementing the rights and guarantees
recognized therein."100 In each case, one has to determine com-
patibility or incompatibility. Moreover, it raises the question as
to whether these treaties can derogate from the norms of the
Second Part of the Constitution.
In other areas, the prescriptions adopted by the constitu-
tional reform are decidedly polemical. For example, the pre-
scriptions permit the immediate re-election of the president and
the legal-political outline of the government, a position which
falls half way between strong presidentialism and certain par-
liamentary features that have had little success in restraining
the former. Nevertheless, with all of its virtues and vices, the re-
form finally concludes a debate whose further extension would
have been unacceptable.
Implementation of many of the changes, that the constitu-
tional reform has made for society, remain at the mercy of those
who enact subsequent legislation. Thus, the independence of thejudiciary will depend on how the Council of the National Judici-
ary and the jury of impeachment. The future of the Public Min-
istry depends upon the law that regulates it. Any real limitation
of the executive's power to issue decrees of necessity and urgency
also depends upon the dictates of a law. The generous pro-
nouncements about protection of ecology, free and honest compe-
tition, rights to property in aboriginal lands, the effective degree
of autonomy of the city of Buenos Aires, etc., depends equally on
the regulatory rules that must be enacted. A further example
showing this subordination of Constitutional provisions to ordi-
nary legislation can be found in the final part of Article 36, which
declares: "Congress will sanction a law about public ethics for the
exercise of its duties."
From an operative point of view, the constitutional reform of
1994 is definitely incomplete. It requires first an intelligent in-
99. Id. art. 75(22) and (24).
100. Id. art. 75(22).
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terpretation on the part of its operators-in particular, the
judges-in order to mold it into the rest of the 1853/60 Constitu-
tion, to clarify the doubts that the new texts bring, and to give a
reasonable interpretation to the sometimes over broad and am-
biguous pronouncements. At the same time, it requires a labori-
ous legislative undertaking to enact the large number of rules
needed to complete the constitutional program. In this process,
the legislature can guarantee the principle of supremacy of the
Constitution if it elaborates these norms inspired by the spirit of
greatness, or it can overturn this principle if it is guided by per-
sonal or sectorial partisan interests.
This undertaking is especially difficult when the Constituent
Assembly has transferred to those who legislate the mission of
concluding the building of the Constitution not as to those parts
and sections that are mere adornments, but as to the basic struc-
ture of the State. Only in time will one truly know the result of
this constitutional reform effort. In large measure, then, the
Constitution is still to be done.
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